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欧洲央行货币政策面临的研判难题

Diagnostic Challenges for ECB Monetary Policy

欧洲央行 原文署名：Philip R. Lane原文发布：2026年10月5日 · 原站未注明具体时间

以下为原文逐段中文翻译，保留图表与说明。AI 翻译并经 AI 对照复核，仍可能存在错误；核对数据和引用时请同时查看原文。译文发布：2026年10月7日 19:35（北京时间）。

欧洲央行执行委员会成员菲利普·R.莱恩在“2026年欧洲央行货币政策会议：连接科学与实践”上的主旨演讲

美因河畔法兰克福，2026年10月5日

很高兴欢迎各位参加“2026年欧洲央行货币政策会议：连接科学与实践”。

在本次演讲中，我将阐述确定适当的欧洲央行货币政策时面临的一些研判难题。[1] 我们的利率决策基于三项标准：（i）根据最新经济和金融数据，对通胀前景及其相关风险的评估；（ii）基础通胀的动态；以及（iii）货币政策传导的强度。

依次来看这三项标准，通胀前景中的中期部分在制定适当的货币政策时发挥着核心作用。[2] 在多重冲击影响经济、并在不同时间跨度内逐步显现的情况下，一项首要研判任务是辨识通胀中的中期成分。根据我们的货币政策战略声明，欧洲央行在综合评估所有相关因素的基础上形成中期展望。这是一个高度依赖数据的过程，但其全面性和中期导向意味着，它既不取决于单个数据点，也不依赖单一因果叙事。

具体而言，尽管能源供给冲击目前是通胀的主要驱动力，但我们对中期通胀前景的评估涵盖了广泛的考量。第一，需要仔细评估能源供给冲击的规模及其可能持续的时间。第二，其对中期通胀的影响取决于能源通胀向非能源通胀传导的幅度和持续性。第三，一系列其他因素（财政、人工智能、金融条件）不仅影响能源供给冲击的传导过程，而且也直接影响中期通胀。[3]

在评估通胀前景的相关风险方面，我们的货币政策声明设有内容详尽的风险评估部分，列出了管理委员会提示的主要风险。该部分列举了一系列可能对通胀和经济活动水平造成上行或下行冲击的经济和金融风险。欧元体系工作人员对每一项风险因素的潜在宏观经济影响进行严谨的建模分析。

在某些情况下，我们会公布情景分析，说明通胀和经济活动水平可能对特定风险事件作出怎样的反应。[4] 今年，我们公布了考察能源供给冲击不同路径的情景分析。这些情景有助于人们理解欧洲央行如何评估这些不同能源价格路径的宏观经济影响。[5]

与此同时，公布的情景往往侧重于单一风险因素，例如当前重点关注的能源供给冲击。与货币政策声明中涵盖广泛因素的风险评估部分相一致，我们的货币政策决策除了考虑最近公布的情景，还会考虑范围广泛的其他情景和敏感性分析。

此外，需要明确的是，每一种能源供给冲击情景都包含一组辅助假设，涉及向非能源通胀传导的速度和强度，以及对金融条件和经济活动水平的影响。随着时间推移，需要将这些辅助假设与有关这些机制的不断积累的证据进行对照。

第二项标准是基础通胀。就传导的速度和强度而言，随着能源冲击发生后时间的推移，考察基础通胀指标的实际观测值变得越来越有价值。在不确定性较高、中期预测误差区间较宽的背景下，这一点尤其有用。任何单一基础通胀指标都无法提供充分指引：欧洲央行使用一整套基础通胀衡量指标。[6] 由于能源冲击向非能源通胀传导的强度和持续性在很大程度上取决于具体情境以及一系列协变量，从基础通胀的演变中汲取信息，能够为货币政策的实施提供重要约束。[7]

第三项标准是货币政策传导的强度。在校准货币政策时，整体金融条件发挥着双重作用。第一，在政策利率水平给定的情况下，更广泛的金融条件收紧（例如长期债券收益率上升）会直接降低经济活动水平和通胀。第二，金融条件是决定货币政策传导强度、进而决定在给定通胀前景下适当货币政策立场的主要因素。随着能源供给冲击发生后时间的推移，研究为应对该冲击而作出的政策利率决定所产生的影响，也变得越来越重要。

因此，欧洲央行密切跟踪金融条件和融资条件的各项指标。一些重要的综合指标包括欧洲央行宏观金融条件指数（ECB Macro-Finance Financial Conditions Index，一项针对通胀和产出预测能力进行了优化的金融条件指数）和ECB-BIG指数（该指数利用广泛的指标，及时、综合地评估银行及非银行金融中介机构的中介条件，以及这些条件对投资动态的影响）。[8]

回顾近期情况，刚刚公布的9月通胀数据显示，总体通胀率为3.8%。其中，能源通胀率为18.8%，非能源通胀率为2.3%。以2025年第四季度作为冲击前的基准，当时总体通胀率为2.1%，能源通胀率为负值（-1.1%），非能源通胀率为2.4%。

进一步考察非能源类别的内部构成，食品通胀率从2025年第四季度的2.5%降至2026年9月的1.4%，核心通胀率则从2.4%小幅升至2.5%。[9] 在核心通胀篮子中，非能源商品通胀率从2025年第四季度的0.5%升至2026年9月的1.1%，但服务通胀率从3.4%降至3.2%。

这一变化格局表明，能源供给冲击是今年通胀上升的主要驱动力。尽管非能源通胀率总体没有上升，但各组成部分的相对贡献已经发生变化：服务通胀相对稳定，食品通胀有所下降，而商品通胀有所上升。由于非能源通胀迄今仍受到控制，基础通胀指标表明，中期通胀尚未形成上移趋势。这似乎表明，2022年曾发挥作用的非线性快速调整机制（例如价格调整频率增加），在当前冲击中迄今尚未启动。

不过，我们9月的预测确实预计，非能源通胀率将从2026年的2.3%升至2027年平均2.6%的水平，随后在2028年回落至2.3%。[10] 预计非能源通胀上升，主要是由于能源价格水平冲击向其他部门的滞后传导；不过，经济活动基线预测的上调，以及一些国家管制价格和间接税的变动，也带来了小幅向上推动作用。2027年通胀达到峰值，也与预计天气因素将导致食品价格暂时上涨有关。我们的一整套基础通胀指标，将在判断中期通胀压力的演变是否符合基线预测方面发挥核心作用。

展望未来，在区分短期通胀波动与基础通胀变化时，我们面临几项研判难题。

就能源供给冲击而言，短期和中期通胀前景取决于冲击的持续时间和强度（其作用既体现为对能源通胀的机械性影响，也体现为对经济活动水平的不利影响），以及其向非能源通胀传导的强度。因此，分析能源市场并跟踪能源通胀向更广泛通胀指标的溢出，仍是分析工作议程中的重点任务。[11]

不过，通胀动态还将受到其他力量的影响，包括：（a）财政动态；（b）人工智能；以及（c）整体金融条件。[12]

下文中，我将先讨论与能源供给冲击有关的研判难题，再转向财政、人工智能以及金融条件演变所带来的问题。

今年春季，我曾提出一个分析框架，用来评估不利能源供给冲击对货币政策的影响。[13] 具体而言，适当的货币政策应考虑到，这类冲击的特征有别于同等规模的国内需求冲击。

第一，能源相对价格水平上升会降低用能部门的经济活动水平，而经济中的闲置程度增加将在中期对通胀形成下行压力。第二，由于能源的进口占比很高，能源相对价格水平上升意味着欧元区这类能源净进口地区的贸易条件恶化，从而降低家庭实际收入和企业利润，进而抑制中期通胀压力。第三，如果能源供给冲击源于地缘政治紧张局势，而这种紧张局势可能对全球经济和国际贸易体系产生广泛且持久的影响，那么随之上升的不确定性可能促使预防性储蓄增加，并使投资计划推迟。第四，如果不利供给冲击还导致金融条件收紧，并使银行及其他金融中介机构限制信贷供给，那么需求也会下降。

在其他条件不变的情况下，这些“需求破坏”渠道可以减小为确保通胀及时回归目标而需要作出的货币政策立场调整幅度。[14] 因此，在持续评估能源供给冲击如何影响整体通胀前景时，既需要考虑其直接影响，也需要考虑通过这些渠道产生的间接影响。

自冲突爆发以来，欧元区经济活动水平好于预期。冲突初起时发布的3月预测，将第二季度和第三季度的环比增长率分别设定为0.1%和0.2%。对爱尔兰跨国企业部门的波动进行调整后，第二季度增长率最终为0.3%，而多项调查指标表明，这一势头延续到了第三季度。[15]

判断当前增长势头能够持续多久，是一项重要的研判难题。首先，第二和第三季度大部分时间内的能源冲击，可能小于冲突初起时所担心的程度，从而促成了好于预期的经济表现。自7月以来，油价显著上移，炼油利润空间大幅扩大、天然气价格持续飙升又进一步加剧了冲击。此外，期货市场的信息显示，2027年和2028年油价及天然气价格的回落幅度将小于此前预期。

这第二波能源供给冲击直接给通胀前景带来上行风险，同时也给增长前景带来下行风险。因此，需要密切关注第二波冲击对通胀和经济活动的影响。无论如何，能源供给冲击的总体规模和持续时间仍高度取决于地缘政治的发展，因此整体能源前景可能还会进一步修订。

第二，财政政策目前正在对经济活动提供显著刺激。欧元区的财政立场（经周期调整的初级财政余额的变动）已从2025年的中性转为2026年放松0.5个百分点。这种财政宽松既源于德国的国防和基础设施计划，也源于已进入最后阶段的“下一代欧盟”（Next Generation EU）计划的支出。[16] 相比之下，欧洲央行工作人员预计，2027年和2028年财政将分别收紧0.4和0.2个百分点。[17] 就公共支出的直接作用而言，预计政府消费和政府投资的增速都将在2027年和2028年明显放缓。

今年强劲的财政脉冲正在支撑当前增速，而未来两年预计出现的财政收紧则将对经济活动构成阻力。在我们的模型中，财政政策乘数可能存在很大差异，因此，要评估总体影响，就需要持续开展实证评估。

第三，人工智能正在提振欧元区经济。[18] 数字服务、企业投资和出口领域都可见人工智能相关活动的扩张。

2026年上半年，数字服务产出较上年同期增长6.8%；欧盟委员会调查中的数字服务行业信心指标，在2026年第三季度迄今较上一季度上升了约1个百分点。

人工智能相关生态系统的支出，是推动当前欧元区投资的一个关键因素。在欧洲央行企业电话调查中，企业认为，在本世纪20年代促使它们重新思考投资战略的各项变化中，技术变革最为重要。同样，企业融资可得性调查的证据显示，企业预计在未来12个月内，平均将约9%的投资用于人工智能，而这一比例在已经更密集使用人工智能的企业中更高。数据中心和数字化的投资支出（以信息与通信技术部门的建筑和研发投资，以及企业部门在计算机硬件、软件和数据库方面的投资作为代理指标），自ChatGPT于2022年末推出以来已增长约15%。

数字化继续推动无形资产投资。与此同时，人工智能相关技术硬件的生产在一些国家也很重要。更广泛地说，欧元区是全球人工智能供应链的一部分，正在受益于全球人工智能投资热潮。2024—2025年，人工智能相关出口增长了6.7%，而其他部门的出口表现则较为低迷。

尽管欧元区正在受益于全球人工智能热潮，但也需要认识到，从规模来看，欧洲这轮人工智能热潮与美国或东亚的人工智能热潮并不在同一个量级。虽然人工智能相关投资正在增长，但其起点较低，因此总体宏观经济影响有限。此外，由于手机、笔记本电脑和汽车等与人工智能有关联的产品类别在调和消费者价格指数（HICP）中的权重较低，全球人工智能相关零部件价格上涨对欧元区HICP通胀的溢出影响也受到限制。

尽管欧元区家庭直接和间接持有人工智能相关美国股票，但由此产生的财富效应远小于美国收入较高群体享有的财富效应。欧元区人工智能相关建筑活动的增量，尚不足以对工资走势形成上行压力。更广泛地说，人工智能可能替代某些类别雇员的前景，也可能正在促使欧元区劳动力需求趋于缓和，并削弱那些希望通过涨薪来抵消能源价格上涨影响的劳动者的议价能力。

就人工智能对宏观经济与金融的整体影响而言，全球人工智能投资热潮，以及对更长期限内人工智能将推动全球生产率提升的预期，可能正在促成目前观察到的全球长期利率上升。尤其考虑到欧洲人工智能热潮的规模与全球人工智能热潮并不在同一量级，对欧元区而言，长期利率上升意味着金融条件显著收紧。根据欧洲央行的模型，长期利率上升对经济活动水平有显著不利影响，并会在中期降低通胀。[19]

转向信贷动态，企业信贷增长在2026年上半年持续走强，在夏季前后达到高峰。但此后势头有所减弱，6月至8月间的月度信贷流量有所下降。总体而言，2026年企业债务增长基本与名义国内生产总值（GDP）的增长保持一致。因此，企业债务与GDP之比已稳定在66%左右，在2022—2024年紧缩周期期间下降后出现回升，回到接近全球金融危机前的水平。

企业信贷增加反映了周期性因素和结构性因素的共同作用，不同借款期限受到的影响各异。

周期性因素包括今年第二季度强于预期的经济活动，以及与能源冲击有关的营运资金需求。能源价格飙升可能立即挤压现金流，即便财务状况良好的企业也不例外。企业往往在能够调整生产流程或销售价格之前，就必须支付更高的能源账单和投入成本。这会增加短期融资需求，可能促使企业动用授信额度或寻求营运资金融资来弥补缺口。作为应对，企业可能力求建立流动性缓冲，这与观察到的企业借款和存款同步增长，以及企业贷款与企业存款之间相关性增强的现象一致。

包括人工智能和能源基础设施投资在内的结构性因素，也支撑了借款增长。人工智能生态系统中的企业近期信贷增速显著高于其他方面具有可比性的企业。内部估算表明，人工智能热潮对总体信贷年增速的贡献略低于1个百分点，约占全部增速的四分之一。如果没有人工智能的贡献，ECB-BIG指数就会显示信贷中介条件收紧得更明显。

就企业债务融资的不同来源而言，在中东冲突相关不确定性的背景下，债券发行相对有限，可能促使企业更多依赖银行贷款。这一因素对规模大、评级高的欧元区企业可能尤其重要，它们是2026年银行借款增长的主要推动者。相比之下，小企业通常进入债券市场的渠道更有限，仍然更依赖银行融资。

家庭信贷增长总体仍较为温和，欧元区各国之间存在相当大的差异。从年初到8月，住房抵押贷款年增速一直保持在3.1%左右，而银行购房贷款成本则从2025年末的3.3%升至3.6%。住房抵押贷款仍受到借款成本、住房可负担性以及需求端谨慎态度的制约，不过实际收入改善可能逐步支撑新增贷款。自年初以来，消费信贷年增速一直在5%左右。然而，消费信贷似乎由财务状况较脆弱家庭的流动性需求所推动。[20]

此外，家庭仍对融资成本和信心变化较为敏感。总体而言，家庭信贷增长一直低于名义收入增长，反映了住房市场状况、可支配收入和利率预期的影响。欧元区家庭债务收入比约为80%，接近2004年以来的平均水平。

最后，我在本次演讲中强调，能源价格近期的飙升可以视为能源供给冲击的第二波，此前能源价格在中东冲突爆发之初首次跃升，并在夏季暂时回落。在跟踪第一波冲击持续传导的同时，必须评估第二波冲击对经济活动水平和通胀动态的作用是否会比第一波更强。

我还强调，其他一系列驱动力（财政政策、人工智能和金融条件）也在影响欧元区的产出和通胀动态，既有直接影响，也有通过它们与能源供给冲击相互作用产生的影响。这意味着，不能将适当的货币政策理解为仅由能源供给冲击驱动，而是需要进行多方面的研判。

具体而言，虽然今年增长势头得以维持，但财政脉冲预计将从2026年的正值转为2027年和2028年的负值，而且长期利率近期的显著上升，将使增长放缓并抑制传导，其程度将超过我们9月预测中的估计。人工智能构成双向风险：它对投资、服务活动和出口的积极贡献带来了可喜的提振，但全球人工智能热潮也在推高长期利率，而这种上行压力之大，与欧元区人工智能热潮的规模并不相称。[21]

综合来看，这意味着我们的货币政策仍处于“中间路径”，采取适度应对以控制通胀是合适的。[22] 考虑到能源供给冲击及其他变化，在6月和9月的两轮预测期间将政策利率从2.00%提高至2.50%，是审慎之举。不过，我们并没有预先承诺利率路径。

今后，我们将在每次会议上根据数据作出利率决定，并依托全面而严谨的分析框架及对广泛数据的深入评估，将不断显现的证据纳入考量。这些证据涉及导致通胀偏离的冲击、相对价格冲击在多大程度上显现出转化为更广泛通胀动态的迹象，以及需求破坏渠道在多大程度上发挥作用。本次演讲提出的一系列研判难题，将引导未来几个月的分析工作议程。

  • [1] 本演讲所述观点为个人观点，不应被解读为代表欧洲央行管理委员会的集体立场。
  • [2] 另见我在去年本会议上的开幕演讲：Lane, P.R.（2025），《货币政策的实施》，在“2025年欧洲央行货币政策会议：连接科学与实践”上的主旨演讲，美因河畔法兰克福，10月6日。
  • [3] 这并非完整列表。特别是，本次演讲没有讨论可贸易部门向中国竞争对手流失市场份额正在如何影响欧元区前景，也没有考察国际贸易政策的进一步变化可能如何影响欧元区。参见P.R. Lane（2026），《欧洲与世界经济》，亚洲货币政策论坛主旨演讲，新加坡，5月22日。
  • [4] 另见Lagarde, C.（2026），《在不确定环境中回归基本原则》，在辛特拉举行的2026年欧洲央行中央银行论坛“塑造欧洲未来：创新、增长与稳定”上的演讲，6月29日。
  • [5] 参见欧洲央行2026年9月10日发布的《欧洲央行工作人员对欧元区的宏观经济预测，2026年9月》中题为“中东冲突经济影响的替代情景”的专栏，其中更新了2026年6月欧元体系工作人员预测中首次提出的较温和、不利和严重三种情景。这些情景没有明确说明欧洲央行可能如何调整货币政策，但对通胀和产出影响的量化提供了有用的比较基准。
  • [6] 参见欧洲央行2023年第5期《经济公报》中题为“基础通胀指标：欧元区分析指南”的专栏。该专栏还提醒，在遭受较大冲击后，规模较大、消退较慢的暂时性成分可能被包含在基础通胀指标中，暂时降低这些指标对中期走势的信息含量。具体而言，基础通胀指标通常侧重于预测未来一年或两年的通胀：能源冲击在这样的期限内可能仍在传导至核心通胀，之后才会在更长的时间范围内消退。
  • [7] 另见Arce, Ó.、Battistini, N.、Bouabdallah, O.和Lis, E.（2026），《两次能源危机的故事——初始条件很重要》，欧洲央行博客，欧洲央行。
  • [8] 关于宏观金融条件指数，参见Bletzinger, T.、Martorana, G.和Mistak, J.（2026），《更宽松、更紧缩、更清晰：欧元区的新金融条件指数》，工作论文系列，第3193号，欧洲央行，2月；关于ECB-BIG指数，参见Allayioti, A.、Di Casola, P.和Magistretti, G.（2026），《ECB-BIG指数：跟踪欧元区信贷条件》，《经济公报》，第5期，欧洲央行。
  • [9] 食品类别内部，未加工食品（9月通胀率为4.0%）和加工食品（9月通胀率为0.4%）呈现出不同走势。
  • [10] 参见欧洲央行2026年9月10日发布的《欧洲央行工作人员对欧元区的宏观经济预测，2026年9月》中的表3。非能源通胀路径上移，反映了能源冲击向工资通胀的一定程度传导。与冲击前的2025年12月预测相比，2026年、2027年和2028年的雇员人均报酬增速分别上调了0.1、0.4和0.3个百分点。
  • [11] 参见Bańbura, M.、Bobeica, E.、Giammaria, A.、Porqueddu, M.和Van Spronsen, J.（2025），《预测欧元区能源通胀的新模型》，工作论文系列，第3062号，欧洲央行。该模型还被用于对2026年9月工作人员预测配套情景中能源大宗商品价格向消费端能源价格的传导进行交叉核验。
  • [12] 天气相关冲击还会影响食品通胀，并影响一些国家经济活动随时间变化的路径。不过，这类冲击主要会加大通胀波动，而非构成中期通胀压力的重要来源。在区分波动性冲击与持续性冲击时，将天气变量对短期通胀动态的预测能力纳入分析非常有价值。另见Kuik, F.、Osbat, C.、Vidal-Quadras Costa, I.（即将发表），《大地、风、火与食品杂货账单：探索天气变量对欧元区食品通胀的预测能力》，以及Lane, P.R.（2026），《气候变化与货币政策》中的讨论；后者是在欧洲央行、伦敦政治经济学院（LSE）经济转型专业知识中心及法兰克福金融管理学院联合举办的气候、自然与货币政策会议上的主旨演讲，美因河畔法兰克福，5月5日。
  • [13] 本节参考：Lane, P.R.（2026），《能源供给冲击的分析视角》，在欧洲改革中心晚宴上的讲话，伦敦，5月13日。
  • [14] 反过来，扩张性财政措施会缩小需求破坏的规模，因而可能需要货币政策作出更大幅度的应对。就欧元区整体而言，迄今针对能源冲击的财政应对规模仍然有限，尽管一些成员国的应对力度很大。例如，参见Bouabdallah, O.、Checherita-Westphal, C.和Muggenthaler-Gerathewohl, P.（2026），《评估针对近期能源冲击采取补偿性财政措施的空间》，《经济公报》，第5期，欧洲央行。
  • [15] 第二季度未经调整的GDP增长率为0.6%。但其中包含爱尔兰10.2%的季度GDP增长率。经修正的国内需求（第二季度下降0.8%）是衡量爱尔兰经济活动水平更合适的代理指标，因此调整后0.3%的GDP增长率是反映欧元区状况更有用的指标。对跨国企业的会计处理也会影响生产率、投资、出口和进口数据。
  • [16] 关于国防支出作用的讨论，参见Checherita-Westphal, C.、Rodríguez-Vives, M.、Lalinský, T.和M. Parker（2026），《国防支出及其短期和较长期宏观经济影响》，《经济公报》，第6期，欧洲央行；以及Lane, P.R.（2026），《国防支出增加与欧元区经济》，在EEA/ESEM年度会议上的演讲，都柏林，2026年8月17日。
  • [17] 参见欧洲央行2026年9月10日发布的《欧洲央行工作人员对欧元区的宏观经济预测，2026年9月》中题为“财政展望”的专栏。除国防和基础设施投资以及NGEU资助的项目外，2026年的财政宽松还反映了养老金支出及其他社会转移支付的强劲增长，以及规模约为GDP的0.1%的临时能源支持措施。
  • [18] 关于欧洲央行对人工智能影响欧元区经济的分析，更多详情参见Lagarde, C.（2026），《欧洲议会经济和货币事务委员会听证会》，在欧洲议会经济和货币事务委员会听证会上的演讲，布鲁塞尔，9月；以及Lane, P.R.（2026），《人工智能与欧元区经济》，在ECB-SAFE-RCEA气候—宏观经济—金融交互关系国际会议（3CMFI）上的主旨演讲，美因河畔法兰克福，3月23日。
  • [19] 参见第21页幻灯片：Lane, P.R.（2026），《欧元区经济展望》，在国际货币与银行研究中心（ICMB）的讲座，日内瓦，9月23日。
  • [20] 尽管耐用品消费前景疲弱，无抵押贷款增长却尤为强劲。这与银行贷款调查的结果一致：在消费者信心低迷、耐用品支出减少的情况下，需求疲弱。消费者预期调查还显示，在欧元区，财务状况较脆弱的家庭更常申请消费信贷，而这些家庭也更可能预计自身偿还住房抵押贷款会遇到困难。
  • [21] 此外，货币政策声明的风险评估部分还指出了金融市场情绪逆转带来的下行风险。
  • [22] 另见Lagarde, C.（2026），《应对能源冲击：风险与政策应对》，在美因河畔法兰克福歌德大学货币与金融稳定研究所举办的“欧洲央行及其观察者”会议上的主旨演讲，3月25日；以及Lane, P.R.（2025），《通胀偏离与货币政策》，在由斯洛文尼亚央行与意大利央行、国际清算银行、欧洲央行及比利时国家银行（Nationale Bank van België/Banque nationale de Belgique）联合举办的第15届汇率研讨会上的主旨演讲。
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Diagnostic Challenges for ECB Monetary Policy

Keynote speech by Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the ECB Conference on Monetary Policy 2026: bridging science and practice

Frankfurt am Main, 5 October 2026

It is a pleasure to welcome you to the 2026 edition of the ECB Conference on Monetary Policy: bridging science and practice.

In this speech, I lay out some diagnostic challenges in determining the appropriate ECB monetary policy. [1] Our interest rate decisions are based on three criteria: (i) our assessment of the inflation outlook and the risks surrounding it, in light of the incoming economic and financial data; (ii) the dynamics of underlying inflation; and (iii) the strength of monetary policy transmission.

Taking these criteria in turn, the medium-term component of the inflation outlook plays a central role in setting the appropriate monetary policy. [2] With multiple shocks hitting the economy and playing out over different time horizons, a primary diagnostic task is to distil the medium-term component of inflation. In line with our monetary policy strategy statement, the ECB formulates its medium-term outlook based on an integrated assessment of all relevant factors. This is a highly data-dependent process, but its comprehensive nature and medium-term orientation means that it is neither data point-dependent nor does it rely on a mono-causal narrative.

In particular, while the energy supply shock is currently the main driver of inflation, our assessment of the medium-term inflation outlook draws on a wide range of considerations. First, the magnitude and likely duration of the energy supply shock requires careful assessment. Second, its impact on medium-term inflation depends on the scale and persistence of pass through from energy inflation to non-energy inflation. Third, a range of other factors (fiscal, AI, financial conditions) not only intermediate the transmission of the energy supply shock but also have direct implications for medium-term inflation. [3]

In terms of the assessment of the risks surrounding the inflation outlook, our monetary policy statement contains a substantial risk assessment section, which lists the main risks flagged by the Governing Council. It reports an array of economic and financial risks that might generate upside or downside shocks to inflation and activity levels. The potential macroeconomic impact of each of these risk factors is rigorously modelled by Eurosystem staff.

In some cases, we publish scenarios that map out how inflation and activity levels might respond to specific risk events. [4] This year, we have published scenarios that examine different paths for the energy supply shock. These scenarios have been helpful in guiding understanding of how the ECB assesses the macroeconomic impact of these alternative paths of energy prices. [5]

At the same time, the published scenarios tend to focus on single risk factors, as with the current focus on the energy supply shock. In line with the wide-ranging risk assessment section of the monetary policy statement, our monetary policy decisions take into account a broad range of scenarios and sensitivity analyses in addition to the most recently-published scenarios.

Moreover, it is important to be clear that each of the energy supply shock scenarios contains a set of ancillary assumptions in relation to the speed and intensity of pass-through to non-energy inflation and the impact on financial conditions and activity levels. Over time, these ancillary assumptions need to be compared with the accumulating evidence on these mechanisms.

The second criterion is underlying inflation. In relation to the speed and intensity of passthrough, as time passes since the origination of the energy shock, it is increasingly valuable to examine the realised values of the indicators of underlying inflation. This is especially useful in the context of the wide error bands that surround medium-term forecasts at times of high uncertainty. No single indicator of underlying inflation provides sufficient guidance: the ECB maintains a battery of underlying inflation measures. [6] Given that the strength and persistence of the pass-through of an energy shock to non-energy inflation is highly context-specific and depends on a range of covariates, learning from the evolution of underlying inflation provides important discipline in the conduct of monetary policy. [7]

The third criterion is the strength of monetary transmission. In calibrating monetary policy, overall financial conditions play a dual role. First, for any given level of the policy rate, a tightening in broader financial conditions (for instance, an increase in long-term bond yields) directly reduces activity levels and inflation. Second, financial conditions are a primary factor in determining the strength of monetary transmission and thereby the appropriate monetary policy stance for a given inflation outlook. As time passes since the origination of the energy supply shock, it is also increasingly relevant to study the impact of the policy rate decisions that have been taken in response to the shock.

Accordingly, the ECB closely tracks measures of financial conditions and financing conditions. Some important aggregate measures include the ECB Macro-Finance Financial Conditions Index (a financial conditions index that is optimised in terms of predictive power for inflation and output) and the ECB-BIG index (an index which draws on a broad range of indicators to provide a timely, integrated assessment of intermediation conditions across banks and non-bank financial intermediaries, and their implications for investment dynamics). [8]

In reviewing recent developments, the just-released September inflation data show headline inflation at 3.8 per cent. The headline rate consists of a rate of energy inflation of 18.8 per cent and a rate of non-energy inflation of 2.3 per cent. Taking the fourth quarter of 2025 as a pre-shock benchmark, headline inflation stood at 2.1 per cent, with energy inflation in negative territory (-1.1 per cent) and non-energy inflation running at 2.4 per cent.

Looking inside the non-energy aggregate, food inflation declined from 2.5 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2025 to 1.4 per cent in September 2026, and core inflation ticked up from 2.4 per cent to 2.5 per cent. [9] Within the core basket, non-energy goods inflation moved up from 0.5 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2025 to 1.1 per cent in September 2026 but services inflation declined from 3.4 per cent to 3.2 per cent.

This profile shows that the energy supply shock has been the primary driver of the rise in inflation this year. While the non-energy inflation rate has not increased in the aggregate, the relative contributions of the individual components have shifted: although services inflation has been relatively stable, there has been a fall in food inflation but an upward move in goods inflation. With non-energy inflation remaining contained so far, underlying inflation indicators indicate that an upward shift in medium-term inflation has not taken hold. This suggests that the nonlinear rapid-adjustment mechanisms (such as an increase in the frequency of price adjustments) that were at play during 2022 have not been activated so far during the current shock.

However, our September projections do anticipate an increase in non-energy inflation from 2.3 per cent in 2026 to an average of 2.6 per cent in 2027 before falling back to 2.3 per cent in 2028. [10] The expected increase in non-energy inflation is primarily due to the lagged pass-through of the energy price level shock to other sectors, although there are also some marginal upward contributions from the upgraded baseline for economic activity and shifts in administered prices and indirect taxes in some countries. The peak inflation in 2027 is also due to the anticipated weather-related temporary increase in food prices. Our set of underlying inflation indicators will play a central role in diagnosing whether the evolution of medium-term inflation pressures will track our baseline projections.

Looking ahead, there are several diagnostic challenges in differentiating between near-term inflation volatility and shifts in underlying inflation.

In relation to the energy supply shock, the near-term and medium-term inflation outlook depends on its duration and intensity (via both the mechanical impact on energy inflation and also its adverse impact on activity levels) and the strength of pass-through to non-energy inflation. It follows that analysing energy markets and tracking the spillover from energy inflation to broader inflation measures are tasks that remain high on the analytical agenda. [11]

However, inflation dynamics will also be shaped by additional forces, including: (a) fiscal dynamics; (b) AI; and (c) overall financial conditions. [12]

In what follows, I first discuss the diagnostic challenges associated with the energy supply shock before turning to the issues raised by fiscal, AI and the evolution of financial conditions.

In the spring, I outlined an analytical framework to assess the implications for monetary policy of an adverse energy supply shock. [13] In particular, the appropriate monetary policy should take into account that such a shock has different characteristics relative to an equivalent shock to domestic demand.

First, an increase in the relative price level of energy will lower activity levels in energy-using sectors, with more slack in the economy putting downward pressure on inflation over the medium term. Second, since energy has a high import content, an increase in the relative price level of energy constitutes a deterioration in the terms of trade for a net energy-importing region such as the euro area, reducing the real incomes of households and the profits of firms and thereby working against medium-term inflation pressures. Third, if the energy supply shock is the product of geopolitical tensions that might have broad and long-lasting implications for the global economy and international trading system, then the associated rise in uncertainty may induce a rise in precautionary saving and delay investment plans. Fourth, if the adverse supply shock also tightens financial conditions and causes banks and other financial intermediaries to restrict credit supply, demand will also be lowered.

All else being equal, these “demand destruction” channels can limit the required adjustment in the monetary stance to ensure the timely return of inflation to the target. [14] It follows that the ongoing assessment of how the energy supply shock is shaping the overall inflation outlook needs to take into account not only the direct impact but also the indirect impact via these channels.

Since the onset of the conflict, activity levels in the euro area have been better than expected. The March projections at the start of the conflict specified quarter-on-quarter growth rates of 0.1 per cent for the second quarter and 0.2 per cent for the third. Adjusting for volatility in the multinational sector in Ireland, the growth rate in the second quarter turned out to be 0.3 per cent, while various survey indicators suggest that this momentum carried into the third quarter. [15]

Understanding the durability of current momentum is a major diagnostic challenge. First, compared with initial concerns at the start of the conflict, it is plausible that the energy shock during much of the second and the third quarters proved to be smaller than feared, contributing to better-than-expected economic performance. Since July, there has been a significant upward shift in oil prices, compounded by sharp increases in refining margins and a sustained surge in gas prices. Moreover, the information from the futures markets indicates that the reversion in oil and gas prices over 2027 and 2028 will be less steep than previously expected.

This second wave of the energy supply shock poses direct upside risks to the inflation outlook but also downside risks to the growth outlook. It follows that the impact of the second wave on inflation and activity will require close monitoring. In any event, the overall size and duration of the energy supply shock remain highly dependent on geopolitical developments, such that the overall energy outlook may be subject to further revisions.

Second, fiscal policy is currently providing substantial stimulus to economic activity. The fiscal stance (the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance) of the euro area has moved from neutral in 2025 to a loosening of 0.5 percentage points in 2026. The fiscal loosening can be attributed both to the German defence and infrastructure programmes and spending under the Next Generation EU programme, which is in its final stages. [16] In contrast, ECB staff expect fiscal tightening for 2027 and 2028, amounting to 0.4 and 0.2 percentage points respectively. [17] In terms of the direct role of public spending, the growth rates of both government consumption and government investment are expected to moderate notably in 2027 and 2028.

The strong fiscal impulse this year is contributing to the current growth rate, while the expected fiscal tightening over the next couple of years constitutes a headwind to economic activity. Our models admit wide variation in the multipliers associated with fiscal policy, such that assessing the overall impact will require ongoing empirical assessment.

Third, AI is boosting the euro area economy. [18] The expansion in AI-related activity is visible in digital services, business investment and exports.

Production in digital services grew by 6.8 per cent in the first half of 2026 compared with the same period last year, and the European Commission’s survey on confidence in digital services sectors rose by about one percentage point so far in the third quarter of 2026 from the previous quarter.

Spending on the AI-related ecosystem is a key factor spurring current euro area investment. Firms in the ECB Corporate Telephone Survey rank technological change as the most important development of the 2020s prompting them to rethink their investment strategies. Similarly, evidence from the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises shows that firms expect to allocate on average around nine per cent of their investment to AI over the next twelve months, and this share is higher among firms that already use AI more intensively. Investment spending on data centres and digitalisation – proxied by buildings and R&D in the ICT sector, as well as investment in computer hardware, software and databases in the business economy – has increased by about 15 per cent since the launch of ChatGPT in late 2022.

Intangible investment continues to be spurred by digitalisation. At the same time, the production of AI-related technological hardware is also important in some countries. More generally, the euro area is part of the global AI supply chain and is benefiting from the global AI investment boom. AI-related exports grew by 6.7 per cent over 2024-2025, in contrast to the muted export performance of other sectors.

While the euro area is benefiting from the global AI boom, it is also important to appreciate that the quantitative scale of the European AI surge is of a different order to the AI boom in the US or East Asia. Although AI-related investment is growing, it is from a low base, and so its overall macroeconomic impact is contained. In addition, the spillover from rising global prices of AI-related components to euro area HICP inflation is bounded by the low HICP weighting of AI-adjacent product categories such as phones, laptops and cars.

Although euro area households are direct and indirect holders of AI-related US equities, the scale of the wealth effect pales in comparison to the wealth effect enjoyed by higher-income cohorts in the United States. The increase in AI-related construction activity in the euro area is not of sufficient scale to put upward pressure on wage dynamics. More generally, the prospect of AI substituting for some types of employees may also be contributing to the moderation in labour demand in the euro area and weakening the bargaining power of workers seeking higher wages to offset the impact of higher energy prices.

In terms of the overall macro-financial impact of AI, the global AI investment boom and expectations of a future global AI-driven productivity boost at longer-term horizons are plausibly contributing to the observed global increase in long-term interest rates. Especially since the scale of the European AI boom is not of the same order as the global AI boom, the increase in long-term interest rates constitutes a material tightening of financial conditions for the euro area. According to ECB models, an increase in long-term interest rates has a material adverse impact on activity levels and lowers inflation over the medium term. [19]

Turning to credit dynamics, corporate credit growth strengthened through the first half of 2026, reaching a peak around the summer. However, it has since lost some momentum, with monthly flows declining between June and August. Overall, in 2026 the growth in corporate debt has been broadly in line with that of nominal GDP. As a result, the corporate debt-to-GDP ratio has stabilised at around 66 per cent, returning to close to its pre-global-financial-crisis level and rebounding from the decline observed during the 2022-2024 tightening cycle.

The increase in corporate credit reflects a combination of cyclical and structural factors, with effects varying across borrowing maturities.

Cyclical factors include stronger than expected economic activity in the second quarter of the year and working capital needs related to the energy shock. The surge in energy prices can create an immediate cash-flow squeeze, even for healthy firms. Higher energy bills and input costs often have to be paid before firms can adjust their production processes or selling prices. This increases short-term financing needs and may lead firms to draw on credit lines or seek working capital finance to bridge the gap. In response, firms may aim to build liquidity buffers, consistent with the concurrent rise observed in corporate borrowing and deposits, and with the stronger correlation between corporate loans and corporate deposits.

Structural factors, including investment in AI and energy infrastructure, have also supported borrowing. Firms across the AI ecosystem have recently recorded substantially stronger credit growth than otherwise comparable firms. Internal estimates suggest that the AI boom accounts for just under one percentage point of aggregate annual credit growth, or roughly one-quarter of the total. In the absence of the AI contribution, the ECB-BIG index would have shown a more marked tightening in credit intermediation conditions.

Across different sources of corporate debt financing, relatively contained bond issuance amid uncertainty surrounding the conflict in the Middle East may have encouraged firms to rely more on bank loans. This may have been particularly relevant for large, highly-rated euro area companies, which have been the main contributors to the increase in bank borrowing in 2026. Smaller firms, by contrast, typically have more limited access to bond markets and remain more reliant on bank finance.

Household credit growth has remained more subdued overall, with considerable variation across euro area countries. Annual mortgage growth stayed at around 3.1 per cent from the start of the year through August, while the cost of bank lending for house purchases rose to 3.6 per cent from 3.3 per cent at the end of 2025. Mortgage lending remains constrained by borrowing costs, housing affordability and cautious demand, although improving real incomes may gradually support new lending. The annual growth rate of consumer credit has been around 5 per cent since the start of the year. However, consumer credit appears to be driven by liquidity needs among financially vulnerable households. [20]

Moreover, households remain sensitive to financing costs and confidence. Overall, household credit growth has remained below growth in nominal income, reflecting housing market conditions, disposable income and interest rate expectations. The euro area household debt-to-income ratio is around 80 per cent, close to its average level since 2004.

In closing, I have highlighted in this speech that the recent surge in energy prices can be interpreted as a second wave of the energy supply shock, following the initial jump at the start of the Middle East conflict and the temporary fall-back during the summer. In addition to tracking the ongoing transmission of the first wave, it is essential to assess whether the second wave will operate more powerfully on both activity levels and inflation dynamics than the first wave.

I have also emphasised that a collection of other driving forces (fiscal policy, AI and financial conditions) are also shaping output and inflation dynamics in the euro area, both directly and via their interactions with the energy supply shock. This means that the appropriate monetary policy should not be interpreted as solely driven by the energy supply shock but rather requires a multi-pronged diagnostic assessment.

In particular, while growth has been holding up this year, the fiscal impulse is projected to turn from positive in 2026 to negative in 2027 and 2028, and the notable recent increases in long-term interest rates will slow growth and reduce pass-through by more than projected in our September exercise. AI constitutes a two-sided risk: its positive contribution to investment, services activity and exports has provided a welcome boost, but the global AI boom is also putting upward pressure on long-term interest rates which is outsized compared with the size of the euro area AI surge. [21]

Taken together, this means that we remain in the “middle path” for monetary policy, in which a measured response is appropriate to keep inflation in check. [22] It was prudent to raise the policy rate from 2.00 to 2.50 per cent over the course of two projection rounds in June and September, given the energy supply shock and the other developments. However, we are not on a pre-committed rate path.

We will base our future interest rate decisions on a meeting-by-meeting, data-dependent basis, drawing on a comprehensive and rigorous analytical framework and a thorough assessment of a broad range of data to take account of the unfolding evidence in relation to the shocks driving inflation deviations, the extent to which there are signs that the relative price shocks are transforming into broader inflation dynamics, and the extent to which demand destruction channels are operating. The set of diagnostic challenges outlined in this speech will drive the analytical work agenda over the coming months.

  • [1] The views expressed in this speech are personal and should not be interpreted as representing the collective view of the ECB Governing Council.
  • [2] See also my opening speech at last year’s edition of this conference: Lane, P.R. (2025), “The conduct of monetary policy,” keynote speech at the ECB Conference on Monetary Policy 2025: bridging science and practice, Frankfurt am Main, 6 October.
  • [3] This is a partial list. In particular, I do not address in this speech how the euro area outlook is being shaped by the loss of market share in the tradable sector to Chinese competitors nor do I examine how further shifts in international trade policies might affect the euro area. See P.R. Lane (2026), “Europe and the world economy,” Keynote speech at the Asian Monetary Policy Forum, Singapore, 22 May.
  • [4] See also Lagarde, C. (2026), “Back to basics in an uncertain environment”, speech at the ECB Forum on Central Banking 2026 “Shaping Europe’s future: innovation, growth and stability” in Sintra, 29 June.
  • [5] See the box entitled “Alternative scenarios for the economic impact of the Middle East conflict” in “ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, September 2026”, ECB, 10 September 2026, which updates the milder, adverse and severe scenarios first presented in the June 2026 Eurosystem staff projections. The scenarios do not spell out how the ECB might adjust monetary policy but the quantification of the inflation and output effects provides helpful benchmarking.
  • [6] See the box entitled “Underlying inflation measures: an analytical guide for the euro area”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 5, ECB, 2023. The box also cautions that, after large shocks, a sizeable and more slowly reverting transitory component can become embedded in underlying inflation measures, temporarily reducing their information content for the medium term. In particular, underlying inflation indicators typically focus on predicting inflation at a one-year or two-year horizon: an energy shock may still be feeding into core inflation at such horizons before dying out at longer horizons.
  • [7] See also Arce, Ó., Battistini, N., Bouabdallah, O. and Lis, E. (2026), “A tale of two energy crises – Initial conditions matter”, The ECB Blog, ECB.
  • [8] On the Macro-Finance Financial Conditions Index, see Bletzinger, T., Martorana, G. and Mistak, J. (2026), “Looser, tighter, clearer: a new Financial Conditions Index for the euro area”, Working Paper Series, No 3193, ECB, February; on the ECB-BIG index, see Allayioti, A., Di Casola, P. and Magistretti, G. (2026), “The ECB-BIG index: tracking credit conditions in the euro area”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 5, ECB.
  • [9] Within the food category, there are divergent patterns for unprocessed food (September inflation at 4.0 per cent) and processed food (September inflation at 0.4 per cent).
  • [10] See Table 3 in “ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, September 2026”, ECB, 10 September 2026. The increase in the path for non-energy inflation reflects some pass through of the energy shock to wage inflation. Relative to the pre-shock December 2025 projections, growth in compensation per employee has been revised up by 0.1, 0.4 and 0.3 percentage points for 2026, 2027 and 2028 respectively.
  • [11] See Bańbura, M., Bobeica, E., Giammaria, A., Porqueddu, M. and Van Spronsen, J. (2025), “A new model to forecast energy inflation in the euro area”, Working Paper Series, No 3062, ECB. The model was also used to cross-check the pass-through of energy commodity prices to consumer energy prices in the scenarios accompanying the September 2026 staff projections.
  • [12] Weather-related shocks will also shape food inflation and affect the time profile for activity in some countries. However, weather-related shocks primarily generate increased inflation volatility rather than constituting a material source of medium-term inflation pressures. In separating volatility shocks and persistent shocks, it is highly valuable to incorporate the forecasting power of weather variables for short-term inflation dynamics. See also Kuik, F., Osbat, C., Vidal-Quadras Costa, I. (forthcoming), “Earth, Wind, Fire and grocery bills: exploring the forecasting power of weather variables for euro area food inflation” and the discussion in Lane, P.R. (2026), “Climate change and monetary policy”, keynote speech at the Climate, Nature and Monetary Policy Conference jointly organised by the ECB, the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) Centre for Economic Transition Expertise and the Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Frankfurt am Main, 5 May.
  • [13] This section draws on: Lane, P.R. (2026), “Analytical perspectives on energy supply shocks,” Dinner remarks at the Centre for European Reform, London, 13 May.
  • [14] Running in the opposite direction, expansionary fiscal measures would reduce the scale of demand destruction and could thereby require a larger monetary policy response. At the aggregate euro area level, the fiscal response to the energy shock so far has been contained, even if it has been substantial in some member countries. See e.g. Bouabdallah, O., Checherita-Westphal, C. and Muggenthaler-Gerathewohl, P. (2026), "Assessing the scope for compensatory fiscal measures in response to the recent energy shock", Economic Bulletin, Issue 5, ECB.
  • [15] The raw GDP growth rate for the second quarter was 0.6 per cent. However, this includes a quarterly Irish GDP growth rate of 10.2 per cent. Modified domestic demand (which fell by 0.8 per cent in Q2) is a better proxy for activity levels in Ireland, such that the adjusted GDP growth rate of 0.3 per cent is a more useful indicator for the euro area. The accounting treatment of multinational firms also affects the data on productivity, investment, exports and imports.
  • [16] For a discussion of the role of defence spending see Checherita-Westphal, C., Rodríguez-Vives, M., Lalinský, T and M. Parker (2026), "Defence spending and its short and longer-term macroeconomic effects" Economic Bulletin, Issue 6, ECB and Lane, P.R. (2026), “The rise in defence spending and the euro area economy”, Speech at the EEA/ESEM. Annual Meetings, Dublin, 17 August 2026.
  • [17] See the box entitled “Fiscal outlook” in “ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, September 2026”, ECB, 10 September 2026. Beyond defence and infrastructure investment and NGEU-funded projects, the loosening in 2026 also reflects strong growth in pension expenditure and other social transfers, as well as temporary energy support measures of around 0.1 per cent of GDP.
  • [18] For more details on ECB analysis of the impact of AI on the euro are economy, see Lagarde, C. (2026), “Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament”, speech at the Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, Brussels, September; and Lane, P.R. (2026), “AI and the euro area economy,” keynote speech at ECB-SAFE-RCEA International Conference on the Climate-Macro-Finance Interface (3CMFI), Frankfurt am Main, 23 March.
  • [19] See Slide 21: Lane, P.R. (2026), “The Outlook for the Euro Area Economy”, lecture at the International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies (ICMB), Geneva, 23 September.
  • [20] Growth has been particularly strong in uncollateralised loans, despite a subdued outlook for durable-goods consumption. This is consistent with the Bank Lending Survey findings of weak demand amid low consumer confidence and reduced spending on durables. The Consumer Expectations Survey also indicates that consumer-credit applications in the euro area are more common among financially vulnerable households, who are more likely to expect difficulties repaying their mortgages.
  • [21] In addition, the risk assessment section of the monetary policy statement flags the downside risks from a reversal in financial market sentiment.
  • [22] See also Lagarde, C. (2026), “Navigating energy shocks: risks and policy responses”, keynote speech at “The ECB and Its Watchers” conference organised by the Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability at Goethe University Frankfurt am Main, 25 March; Lane, P.R. (2025), “Inflation deviations and monetary policy”, keynote speech at the 15th workshop on exchange rates, co-organised by Banka Slovenije with the Banca d’Italia, the Bank for International Settlements, the European Central Bank and the Nationale Bank van België/Banque nationale de Belgique.
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欧洲央行执委菲利普·莱恩在10月5日演讲中表示，能源价格第二轮冲击、财政政策、AI投资和金融环境需要一并评估。能源是近期整体通胀上升的主要来源，AI投资则会同时影响增长和长期利率。他重申，未来利率决定将逐次会议、依据数据作出，不预设路径。

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