霍尔木兹海峡正将航运燃油账单变为供应危机

Hormuz Is Turning Shipping’s Fuel Bill Into a Supply Crisis | OilPrice.com

The Hormuz crisis is not only hitting crude oil and gas, but also container shipping. It is also tightening its grip on global shipping through the fuel tanks of vessels carrying world trade. Disrupted exports, constrained refinery supplies, and increasingly unreliable deliveries are clearly at present pushing the bunker market into a dangerous position. Fuel remains available internationally, but securing the right grade at the right port within a commercially workable window is becoming harder. The consequences will be severe, especially for shipowners, as it extends beyond expensive bunkers. Delayed deliveries and uncertain replenishment are not only threatening voyage schedules but also working capital and the profitability of entire trading routes.

This pressure is measurable. On October 16, Vitol estimated that high-sulfur fuel oil flows through Hormuz, including Iranian supplies, remained at least 800,000 tons per month below February levels. At the same time, the successful attacks by Ukraine on Russian refineries have removed an additional estimated million tons monthly. Meanwhile, North Asian refiners were drawing more than a million tons of HSFO for November processing. Global shipping is therefore competing for a constrained product pool. This is a growing reality, even though low-sulfur supplies have received some support from increased exports from China and Nigeria.

Related: German Power Supply Startups Exit Market as Wholesale Prices Soar

These pressures are now converging on a market that depends as much on reliable distribution as on aggregate production. A ton of fuel awaiting export, committed to another customer or stranded behind a disrupted shipping route cannot satisfy an immediate bunker requirement. The market still doesn't seem to recognize this fully. Refinery output, export capacity, blending components, storage and barge availability must all align before a vessel can refuel. Hormuz has weakened several of those links at once, allowing disruption in one location to ripple through the wider supply chain. The spreading of conflict in the Middle East, especially in and around the Bab El Mandeb and Saudi Arabia, is only increasing the impact.

Fujairah illustrates both the market’s adaptability and its continuing vulnerability. Reuters reported on October 1 that third-quarter fuel oil imports had recovered to 2.6 million tons from 845,000 tons in the second quarter. Nevertheless, September imports remained approximately half February’s level. Yes, supplies were returning, but through a system still operating well below earlier import volumes. A partial recovery in cargo movements cannot establish dependable bunker availability when replenishment remains exposed to renewed interruption. The current security situation in and around Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman doesn’t bode well.

The latest delivery assessments show how uneven that recovery remains. ENGINE’s October 13 outlook put Singapore’s recommended very-low-sulfur fuel oil lead times at 11–18 days, compared with 10–15 days a week earlier. HSFO required 11–17 days. Fujairah’s VLSFO availability had improved, while HSFO and low-sulfur marine gasoil remained limited. Key Omani ports offered a more comfortable marine gasoil position, with one supplier quoting one to two days. The emerging crisis is geographically fragmented, with pressure varying by fuel grade and delivery location.

That fragmentation complicates procurement, without making the commercial damage less serious. A ship requiring fuel within three days cannot necessarily absorb a two-week booking window. Physical shortages become commercially disruptive well before a port exhausts its stocks. The critical threshold will be crossed when available supply can no longer accommodate the schedules on which shipping contracts depend.

Inventory figures can consequently offer misleading reassurance. ENGINE reported that Fujairah’s heavy distillate and residual stocks averaged 4.72 million barrels in early October, approximately 5% above September’s average. At the same time, local bunker availability remains severely constrained. Those inventories do not all represent uncommitted, immediately deliverable marine fuel. Product specifications, ownership, and export obligations determine how much can actually reach a vessel. More barrels in storage can coexist with fewer practical purchasing options for an owner facing a departure deadline.

Here, the market and market participants play a pivotal role. The economics of holding inventory add another vulnerability. S&P Global reported in September that strong backwardation, with prompt fuel priced above later deliveries, was discouraging blenders from maintaining stocks. Blending closer to delivery reduced their exposure to falling prices. However, it also increases sensitivity to delayed or unsuitable components. Across a stressed market, individually rational decisions can remove the collective buffer needed to absorb disruption. We are now looking at a situation in which a replenishment delay that would previously have been manageable can then translate directly into a failed delivery.

At the same time, shippers are looking at financial constraints too. Higher prices are already imposing a substantial financing burden. General Index assessed September VLSFO averages at $872 per ton in Singapore and $939 in Fujairah, up 6% and 15.9%, respectively, from August. An additional $100 per ton increases the cost of a 2,000-ton purchase by $200,000, before accounting for waiting time or diversion expenses. Shippers will calculate all of this; if it repeats across a fleet, such increases demand considerably more cash to maintain existing operations. It seems the media still doesn’t understand that even strong headline freight earnings don't automatically translate into stronger margins.

The next constraint could emerge through credit. When fuel prices rise, an unchanged financing facility buys fewer tons. Suppliers need additional funding to maintain throughput, while owners need more liquidity to cover each voyage. If lenders or counterparties tighten terms, physical availability may be accompanied by financial exclusion: fuel can be purchased, but only by buyers able to provide sufficient cash or security. Smaller operators would be particularly vulnerable to this combination of expensive deliveries and reduced purchasing flexibility.

Owners are already adjusting. Reuters reported on October 16 that bunker purchases were becoming smaller and more frequent, with shorter contractual commitments and greater use of alternative locations, including Port Louis, Colombo, and Salalah. This not only helps operators manage immediate exposure but also shifts demand toward ports that must secure additional replenishment and delivery capacity. Geographic diversification improves options; its effectiveness still depends on the fuel and infrastructure available behind each alternative call.

Over the coming weeks, regional shortages will recur, premiums will remain volatile, and booking requirements will lengthen. A broader crisis will occur if additional export losses coincide with refinery outages and reduced tanker availability.

Shipping does not need every bunker hub to run dry for the damage to become systemic. Schedules will be disrupted if persistent uncertainty over delivery remains in place. Hormuz is steadily turning dependable refueling into a more expensive and conditional service. Customers far beyond the Gulf will be feeling the consequences.

By Cyril Widdershoven for Oilprice.com

More Top Reads From Oilprice.com

• Data Centers Drive Surge in India’s Renewable Power Demand
• Iran War Set to Push PetroChina’s Trading Profit to Record $3 Billion
• Global Gas Crunch Makes Europe’s Remaining Coal Plants Profitable